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Communicating “Reopening” to the Public Credibly 
and Strategically: “Hardware and Heartware” 
Considerations from Singapore for Liverpool City 
Region 
Key takeaways 
1. The COVID-19 pandemic is easing in some parts of the world. This means the
phased reopening of the economy is expected. Communicating the reopening
credibly and strategically to the public is a challenge but also an opportunity for
relevant authorities.
2. A focus on Singapore’s phased reopening is presented, particularly its
communicative experience to the public. Singapore’s careful engagement through
“hardware” (on the ground measures) and “heartware” (creating confidence and
resilience in the public) is documented.
3. Appropriate lessons for Liverpool City Region (LCR) are drawn from Singapore.
“Hardware” measures such as safe distancing measures, crowd control, and
imposing harsh fines for repeat offenders are advocated in the reopening phase. A
“heartware” approach through creating a public gallery to capture LCR’s COVID-19
reopening experience is suggested to instil social resilience among the public.
4. Communicating the post-lockdown reopening credibly is strongly recommended. If
opportune, it should also be carried out strategically where possible in terms of
“hardware” and “heartware” approaches. Additionally, a strategic communication
engaging the “heartware” aspect can reflect LCR’s capacity to foster inclusive care
for the hearts and minds of the locals as they embrace a “new normal” in times of
pandemic.
1. Introduction
While the COVID-19 pandemic is slowing 
down in some parts of the world in the 
second half of 2020, thus prompting the 
relaxation of lockdown measures and the 
reopening of the economy, the threat of a 
second or even a third wave of infections 
still looms large in many countries. This 
was recently seen in Melbourne, Australia, 
and Hong Kong. This second wave of 
infections cannot be underestimated. 
Challenges remain as healthcare services 
continue to be strained and national 
economies disrupted. Any uncontrolled 
second wave will put immense pressure 
on the healthcare sector and delay the 
economy’s recovery. 
This policy brief uses Singapore as a case 
study to reflect upon how it tackles the 
COVID-19 pandemic, particularly its 
gradual reopening of the economy and the 
associated measures taken after its 
nationwide partial lockdown, the “circuit-
breaker” (CB), ended in early June to 
prevent a second wave of infections and 
allowing the economy to recover faster 
post-CB. This briefing focuses mainly on 
how and why the safe transition measures 
are carried out in specific manners in 
Singapore, and draws some relevant 
lessons from Singapore’s communicative 
experience in terms of “hardware” and 
“heartware” to the public for the Liverpool 
City Region (LCR) to consider for adaption 
in both the short and long terms. In doing 
so, the policy briefing is mindful that there 
are distinct differences between both 
places. Singapore is both a country and a 
city-state. This means a strong centralised 
decision-making approach is more natural 
to take in engaging COVID-19 concerns. 
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However, the metropolitan area of LCR 
can still learn from Singapore’s safe 
transition experience in its recovery from 
the COVID-19 pandemic. 
2. Communicating credibly:
Singapore’s “Safe Transition” post-
CB
Before highlighting the nature of 
Singapore’s safe transition post-partial 
lockdown, some earlier background 
context is provided. Singapore had its first 
case of COVID-19 on 23 January 2020. 
By the end of March, local transmissions 
had grown rapidly and Singapore 
reigstered 926 confirmed cases (Ministry 
of Health 2020a). In early April, the Prime 
Minister (PM) of Singapore, Lee Hsien 
Loong, gave a televised speech to update 
the nation on the COVID-19 situation. PM 
Lee indicated that despite Singapore’s 
best efforts, the numbers of cases had 
climbed by more than 50 new cases daily 
and several clusters were detected at 
foreign worker dormitories (Prime 
Minister’s Office 3 April 2020). PM Lee, in 
discussion with the Multi-Ministry Task 
Force (MTF) set up to tackle COVID-19 in 
Singapore, decided to move decisively to 
impose significantly stricter measures, 
describing them as a “circuit breaker” (CB) 
(Lee 2020). The enforcement took place 
on 7 April 2020 and was planned to lapse 
on 4 May 2020. Key features of the CB 
were the closure of all non-essential 
workplaces, and the closure of all schools 
except pre-schools, which would stay 
open for the children of those employed in 
essential services (Yuen 2020). Another 
notable feature was the discontinuation of 
dining-in. In mid-April, Singapore made 
the wearing of masks in public mandatory 
(still in effect), with fines and prosecution 
for offenders who refuse to do so. While 
the CB’s measures were working in the 
first few weeks, the spread of the virus, 
however, was not slowed down to the 
extent expected. This subsequently led to 
an extension of the CB to 1 June 2020 
(announced in late April), in order to 
"decisively" bring down the number of 
cases in the community, and to make sure 
that Singapore could detect and contain 
the virus early if any "leakage" occured 
from the foreign worker dormitories to the 
wider community (Lai 2020; Mohan 2020). 
On 19 May 2020, Singapore announced 
that it would exit the CB on 1 June 2020 
after the MTF assessment that the 
situation had stabilised (Ministry of Health 
2020b). It was a slow, progressive 
reopening, where the state was mindful of 
a resurgence of transmission potentially 
creating a second wave. Phase One 
started on 2 June and lasted until 18 June 
2020. It was focused on “Safe Re-
opening” of five aspects (see Figure 1), 
namely “Community, Commuting, Home, 
School, and Workplaces”. In particular, the 
schools saw priority given to graduating 
batches such as Primary 6 (Primary 
School Leaving Examination), Secondary 
4 and Secondary 5 students (GCE ‘O’ 
Levels) as they attended school on 
weekdays. The rest of the upper levels 
(Primary 4 and 5, or Secondary 3) 
alternated weekly with the lower levels 
(Primary 1, 2, and 3, or Secondary 1 and 
2), where one week was spent in the 
schools, followed by a switch to home-
based learning the next week (Ang 2020). 
Phase One also saw dining-in not 
resumed, as eateries and restaurants 
were given time to get safe-distancing 
measures implemented on the ground. 
The safe transition of reopening during 
Phase One took place over approximately 
two weeks, with Phase Two starting on 19 
June 2020 after it was deemed by the 
MTF that community transmission 
remained low and stable. It is worth noting 
that the exact start date of Phase Two 
was not indicated in mid-May, when it was 
announced that Singapore would exit the 
CB on 1 June 2020. The message to the 
public then was carefully crafted: that 
Singapore had to remain in Phase One 
until it was safe to progress further and 
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Phase Two’s starting date was only 
announced four days before on 15 June 
2020. Phase Two (“Safe Transition” - see 
Figure 2) saw the key resumption of 
dining-in and retail services, albeit with 
safe-distancing measures being 
implemented and gatherings of more than 
five people considered inadvisable 
(Ministry of Health 2020c). Students from 
all levels except institutes of higher 
learning also returned to school daily from 
29 June 2020. Working from home was 
still strongly encouraged wherever 
possible. 
Figure 1. Safe Re-opening – Phase 1 
 
(Source: https://www.gov.sg/article/covid-19-resources#posters)
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Figure 2. Safe Transition and Safe Nation – Phase 2 and Phase 3
(Source: https://www.gov.sg/article/covid-19-resources#posters)
Some of the measures and achievements 
for which Singapore is best known in its 
battle with the COVID-19 pandemic 
include its aggressive system for testing 
and contact-tracing, its relatively low death 
rate compared to the rest of the world, and 
its usage of the military to help stabilise 
outbreaks in dormitories for foreign 
workers. However, as we move 
progressively to the reopening of 
economies worldwide, it is the way that 
reopening is carried out that matters on 
the long road of recovery. With its phased 
approach to reopening, Singapore is seen 
to have been cautious in this regard. 
Useful lessons could be drawn in other 
places from Singapore’s firm, credible, 
and relatively effective communication in 
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its reopening experience, as countries 
relax their lockdown measures while 
potentially coping with a second wave. 
Phase One was used as a “springboard” 
to fine-tune implementations on the 
ground before moving safely to Phase 
Two. Singapore chose not to rush in 
reopening, post-CB, despite mounting 
pressures to ease restrictions. It chose 
and stuck to the gradual reopening it had 
planned. In the short run, grounded 
measures (the “hardware”) regarding 
workforce and schools, for example, were 
made explicitly and concisely, with fines 
imposed as added deterrence for people 
and organisations flouting rules. In the 
long run, Singapore knows that the much-
desired Phase Three (“Safe Nation”) is still 
far off, with no precise date until an 
effective vaccine is readily available. 
Hence why it was communicated to the 
public that Phase Two (“Safe Transition”) 
will stay for months at least, with residents 
needing to remain vigilant and cooperating 
by adhering to the rules (Yang 2020). 
More widely, crisis response, economic 
and social resilience (such as diversifying 
our food sources) were also repeatedly 
stressed directly and indirectly by the 
government to instil confidence in the 
nation. Such strategic communication 
arguably helps not only to allow Singapore 
to tackle the pandemic in broad and 
decisive strokes for the nation’s economic 
pulse, but also, to some extent, allows a 
careful “scalpel approach” to treat the 
residents’ hearts and minds (the 
“heartware”). In this way, a resilient 
Singapore image is further reinforced 
among the masses. 
3. Some considerations for LCR to 
communicate reopening 
strategically 
There are two aspects on communicating 
reopening strategically for LCR as a 
regional entity following Singapore’s 
experience. First, the “hardware” spatial 
measures to be implemented on the 
ground. Take for example, the reopening 
of pubs in the UK. The reopening drew a 
backlash after the Treasury had “been 
accused of taking an irresponsible 
approach” by hailing the scheduled 
reopening on 4 July 2020 (Rawlinson 
2020). In this case, the LCR should 
emphasise social distancing measures, 
encourage reservations and explore 
staggered timings to reduce crowding in 
public areas. Singapore’s deployment of 
safe distancing ambassadors as “soft 
hardware” measures and the usage of 
“hard hardware” approaches such as 
imposing fines sent strong deterrence 
messages, particularly for the latter. 
Similarly, the relevant LCR authorities 
could explore imposing heavier fines for 
repeat offenders or even the temporary 
closure of pub establishments who fail to 
control crowd size and enforce social 
distancing measures. LCR should 
communicate repeatedly to the public that 
their cooperation is particularly crucial in 
the long battle to contain COVID-19. The 
better LCR manages this on the ground, 
the less it needs to worry about a second 
wave of infection. More importantly, the 
LCR economy can slowly but surely 
recover, and potentially remain nimble to 
changes required in future when strict 
rules need to be adhered. 
The second aspect is related to the 
“heartware”, whereby the common identity 
and vision of LCR as an enlarged 
community is forged in times of pandemic. 
LCR has shown it could consider and take 
a regional response that adapts 
accordingly with the national response 
through the mayor of Liverpool, Joe 
Anderson, where he initially stated he 
would delay schools from reopening 
unless convinced it is safe to do so (BBC 
News 2020). Indeed, some of Singapore’s 
“Safe Transition” measures mentioned 
above regarding schools reopening can 
be adapted accordingly, but the concern 
here is do potentially more. A localised 
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response is useful in creating the 
“heartware’ for LCR, especially 
considering it is one of the areas most 
affected by COVID-19 in the UK. For 
example, LCR could consider creating an 
LCR COVID-19 repository – emulating 
Singapore National Library’s decision to 
enlist the public in the collection and 
preservation of digital materials 
documenting the pandemic (Ng 2020). 
LCR libraries could be tasked with 
carrying out this public engagement 
initiative – reopening post-lockdown in a 
public gallery to capture the memories of 
key sites such as the city centre, port, and 
the University of Liverpool. This could 
serve as an inspiration for other English 
cities. 
Earlier COVID-19 briefs in this series have 
highlighted specific measures to improve 
the “hardware” of the economy, as well as 
areas such as food security and care 
homes. What is perhaps lacking is some 
“heartware” to create a more mentally 
resilient LCR through the documentation 
of collective memories, particularly the 
hardship overcome. This would arguably 
give the public of the LCR the confidence 
and hope to engage COVID-19’s 
detrimental impacts in the next one to two 
years of reopening. In the long run, this 
can be a feature of the LCR’s tourism and 
local cultural landscape, creating 
monetary benefit and instilling collective 
pride. Additionally, strategic 
communication engaging the “heartware” 
aspect can reflect LCR’s capacity to foster 
inclusive care for the hearts and minds of 
the locals as they embrace a “new normal” 
in times of pandemic.  
4. Concluding thoughts
While each country, region and city have 
their own reasons to relax lockdown 
measures – including the significant 
economic and mental health costs – the 
question of how much should be eased 
and how to go about reopening are the 
key challenges. The cost of lost income 
and jobs from not easing lockdown 
measures needs to be carefully weighed 
against the potential cost of precipitating a 
second wave of infections. Moving 
forward, communicating the post-
lockdown reopening credibly is strongly 
recommended. This should be carried out 
strategically, where possible, in terms of 
“hardware” and “heartware” approaches. 
The former is critical to preserving lives. 
The latter approach may prove decisive 
and meaningful in creating a resilient 
mindset. Not communicating clearly and 
effectively for the reopening of the 
economy could create confusion and 
frustration among the public, making 
policies harder to implement and 
objectives harder to achieve.  
LCR should reflect on the capacity to learn 
and adapt appropriate reopening 
measures from Singapore and elsewhere. 
The COVID-19 crisis has surely damaged 
the economy and bruised morale. 
However, it also offers LCR and its people 
an opportunity to emerge tougher and 
forge a stronger collective identity. 
Therefore, the relevant authorities need to 
display resolve and the public to be 
supportive with their cooperation.  
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